Consequences of Catastrophe

I know that lately I've been the black fly in everyone's Chardonnay by continually posting stories about disease, disaster and dastardly countries who want to destroy America. If that turns anyone off, I'm sorry -- not because I've offended but, because I've failed to properly stress the importance of having a personal plan to protect yourself and your family. So, let me make this crystal clear -- do not delegate that responsibility to federal, state and local governments who are woefully unprepared -- and admit it.

From an article by David Wood:

U.S. military forces are poorly equipped and untrained to face nuclear-armed opponents such as North Korea who are seeking to neutralize American military superiority [and will be ready to launch their long-range missile this weekend] -- much as insurgents did with IEDs in Iraq.

Defense Department experts say soldiers and Marines haven't been equipped or trained to fight in a nuclear-contaminated environment since the Cold War ended a generation ago. Aircraft carriers, warplanes and military command and communications networks are insufficiently hardened against the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generated by a nuclear blast that can burn out electronics systems.

The following excerpts [examples of the govt's unpreparedness] are from: Report of the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study: Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. Interests (pdf 10MB)

A woman picks through the debris of her house destroyed by hurricane Katrina.

Disasters brought about by enemy action in the homeland cannot be precisely predicted, although conditions leading up to them may be generally evident. In any event, surprise should be an expected element of an attack(s). Dealing with the consequences of the attack(s) will have as much or more to do with addressing common issues as with the specific nature or cause or an attack. Planners should anticipate the breakdown of orderly society, manifested by:

• failure of critical infrastructure - lack of goods and services (see first table below)
• insufficient professional resources to deal with multiple catastrophes - response forces (Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Guard, DOD, DHS, police, fire, American Red Cross, and others) sized to handle only one or two crises at a time
• national will hard to focus - public anger manifested through misguided, vigilante-style attacks
• impaired ability of national, state, and local governments to govern - lack of, or confusing, communications; fractured local authority; insufficient, disorganized emergency response

Examples of Consequences of Attacks on the Infrastructure.

Without adequate preparedness at all levels of government, across the private sector, and among the populace, the post-attack results could indeed become catastrophic. Some outcomes might include:

• Flight. Remaining in place would prove untenable for many people for actual or perceived reasons.
• Breakdown of mutual aid agreements. Resource-intensive incidents are typically handled through mutual aid agreements within the National Guard, first responder, and medical communities. When under attack, however, leaders in unaffected regions might opt not to support interregional common aid agreements and to conserve their resources in case they are needed locally.
• Breakdown of civil order. Looting, vigilante actions, gang violence, riots, and civil disobedience would further stress first responders.
• Failure of quarantine. Many will be reluctant to stay confined.
• Hoarding. People will rush to amass excess goods to stock up after the attack.
• "Shoot your neighbor." As people perceive the social and civil situation deteriorating, they will escalate the force they use as a first resort to protect home and family from interlopers ("shoot first, ask questions later").
• Rampant rumors. Medial will promulgate messages from many sources without confirmation. [i.e. Twitter]
  
• Population center "meltdowns." Many U.S. population centers are located where life without infrastructure services will be difficult to sustain, such as in the desert southwest in summer and northern cities in winter.

Responses will be further exacerbated because of the evolution of U.S. society. Dependence on "just-in-time" centrally managed, networked supplies of water, power, food, communications, and transportation leaves the United States extremely vulnerable to an effects-based attack. Additionally, over time, mobility of the American population has resulted in a breakdown of extended family and community-based societal structures that once provided informal local leadership and community organization and support. In twenty-first century society, many do not know their neighbors, let alone have the capability or capacity to form effective support networks for long periods of time. Skepticism of authority makes governance in a disaster difficult, while the public nevertheless expects governmental assistance to mitigate the aftermath.

Size Indicators of Some Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets.

With the current preparedness system and [disaster] exercise program, the involved agencies at all levels of government unfortunately end up training on real world events. The history of major disasters shows the same lessons observed, over and over again.

Learning from these lessons is much less evident. During each new event solutions found earlier are often re-invented. When asked about specific threats and exercises, a representative of the International Association of Fire Chiefs indicated little training to address enemy attacks on the homeland, but "I'm sure if it happens, we'll find a way to get it done." ###

Remind you of anyone?...

Time to fish that fly out and drink up. This one's on me. - c