Oh where, oh where has my Afghan gun gone?

A trainee from the 1st Battalion of the Afghan National Army gets his AK47 cleared by a U.S. Army Special Forces Soldier at a firing range after squad live fire training excercises in Kabul, Afghanistan, on July 14, 2002. The purpose of this training is to establish the core of the new Afghan National Army, which will foster a safe, secure and stable environment in Afghanistan and help to prevent the re-emergence of terrorist forces. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Bethann Hunt)

As part of international efforts to train and equip the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, collectively referred to as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the U.S. has been responsible for procuring and distributing about 380,000 small arms and light weapons. These include grenade launchers, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, mortars, pistols, rifles, and shotguns. The Department of Defense and 21 donor nations report the value of these weapons at over $223 million.

Given the unstable security conditions in Afghanistan, lapses in accounting for these weapons is significant.

Types and Quantities of U.S.-Procured Weapons Shipped to Afghanistan (December 2004-June 2008).

Enter the United States Government Accountability Office and a new report that reveals sloppy inventory records for an estimated 87,000 weapons—or about 36 percent—of the 242,000 weapons that the United States procured and shipped to Afghanistan from December 2004 through June 2008.

Serial numbers were not recorded for about 46,000 of these weapons, and for an estimated 41,000 weapons with recorded serial numbers, no records were maintained of their location or disposition. Furthermore, no reliable records were maintained for any of the weapons obtained from international donors from June 2002 through June 2008, which totaled about 135,000 weapons.

Lapses in accountability occurred throughout the supply chain. For example, during the transportation of U.S.-procured weapons into Afghanistan, no serial numbers were provided to verify receipt. Additionally, after receiving weapons in Kabul, no record was made of their serial numbers nor were routine physical inventories conducted at the central depots where the weapons were stored.

Also, monitoring the end use of sensitive night vision devices was not begun until about 15 months after issuing them to Afghan National Army units.

The GAO's conclusion? Units in Afghanistan cannot fully safeguard and account for weapons and weapons provided to ANSF are at serious risk of theft or loss.

Now that just doesn't add up! This is much more serious than a coat room attendant misplacing one's purse (with gun.) Losing track of this amount of firepower is closer to aiding the enemy in misplacing the coat attendant! Pitiful.